Can one person move the money in Echo Protocol eBTC on Monad? The authority score is 37 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
In short. A bare EOA holding every admin role (no multisig, no mint cap) was compromised on 2026-05-18 and minted 1,000 unbacked eBTC in one transaction - ~$76.6M notional, ~$816K realized after laundering. Not hypothetical: independently confirmed on-chain via the exact transaction.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 50 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A bare EOA holding every admin role (no multisig, no mint cap) was compromised on 2026-05-18 and minted 1,000 unbacked eBTC in one transaction - ~$76.6M notional, ~$816K realized after laundering. Not hypothetical: independently confirmed on-chain via the exact transaction.
real, dated exploit - now on a 3-of-4 Safe
This card shows the CURRENT state, not the incident-era one: within ~10 hours the key was rotated, through two hops, to a real 3-of-4 Gnosis Safe - confirmed live via hasRole()/getOwners()/getThreshold(), with both the original compromised EOA and the attacker address independently confirmed to no longer hold the admin role. MINTER_ROLE currently has no holder at all (minting is effectively paused). Composite reflects a genuine but recent, exploit-driven remediation - moderate, not high, since the rotation happened under active-exploit duress only 4 months before this pass.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 37 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 55 to 62, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/monad-0xd691b0afed67f96cec28ab6308cbe5b2c103b7e9.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count); the protocol's total value locked (no DefiLlama match).
Contract: 0xd691b0afed67f96cec28ab6308cbe5b2c103b7e9 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xd691b0afed67f96cec28ab6308cbe5b2c103b7e9) on the Monad oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 71327646, methodology 0x4988d9ca0f320921…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (AccessControl (ERC-165) whose admin-role holders are not enumerable on-chain: read them from RoleGranted events; nothing for this reader to compare). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.monad.xyz/ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000d691b0afed67f96cec28ab6308cbe5b2c103b7e9"},"0x4405f9e"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (37 = 0x25); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.