Can one person move the money in Kuru Router + MarginAccount on Monad? The authority score is 43 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. A real, actively-used 3-of-5 Safe (70 prior transactions) with no timelock at all - the same Safe can pause the protocol and upgrade every deployed OrderBook market’s logic.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 55 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $329k behind one key.
A real, actively-used 3-of-5 Safe (70 prior transactions) with no timelock at all - the same Safe can pause the protocol and upgrade every deployed OrderBook market’s logic.
composite 43
Per Kuru’s own docs, this Safe is “the default owner of all markets and can be used to upgrade markets to a new implementation” - though market creation itself is a separate, permissionless path, not owner-gated.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 43 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): timelock from 0 to 57, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/monad-0xd651346d7c789536ebf06dc72ae3c8502cd695cc.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $988k (DefiLlama), of which $563k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xd651346d7c789536ebf06dc72ae3c8502cd695cc on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xd651346d7c789536ebf06dc72ae3c8502cd695cc) on the Monad oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 71327646, methodology 0x4988d9ca0f320921…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x8b73…788b has executed 70 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 3-of-5 of 5 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 3-of-5 0x8b73…788…788b via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $329k behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 3 keys collude to act; 3 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 5 plain keys. Implementation behind the proxy: 0xf1635175914acf4db170395d524323225e1f1a04 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xd651346d7c789536ebf06dc72ae3c8502cd695cc","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x6c6c938"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0xd651346d7c789536ebf06dc72ae3c8502cd695cc","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 113690920 and 113690936 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.monad.xyz/ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000d651346d7c789536ebf06dc72ae3c8502cd695cc"},"0x4405f9e"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (43 = 0x2b); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.