Can one person move the money in Euler V2 eVaultFactory on Monad? The authority score is 64 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. eVaultFactory.upgradeAdmin() is a Governor whose only admin is a 4-day TimelockController: a 4-of-8 DAO Safe is the sole proposer and anyone can execute once the delay passes, so no on-chain token vote is in the path. The delay has one bypass: PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE, held by a 2-of-6 Labs Safe and two bare EOAs, can put every upgradeable vault into read-only mode instantly.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 80 |
| timelock | 60 |
| price feed | 2 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
eVaultFactory.upgradeAdmin() is a Governor whose only admin is a 4-day TimelockController: a 4-of-8 DAO Safe is the sole proposer and anyone can execute once the delay passes, so no on-chain token vote is in the path. The delay has one bypass: PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE, held by a 2-of-6 Labs Safe and two bare EOAs, can put every upgradeable vault into read-only mode instantly.
cross-exposure: 80, same 8 DAO signers as Plasma
Every vault this factory has deployed is flagged upgradeable, so its implementation reaches all of them. The DAO Safe’s 8 signers are identical to Euler’s DAO Safe on Plasma at a different Safe address. The 2-of-3 Security Council Safe holds only CANCELLER_ROLE on the factory timelock, and no role on the factory Governor, the emergency governor or either emergency timelock. The same two bare EOAs hold PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE on Plasma’s Euler Governor too.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths not all checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 53.00% (score 64). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 55 to 94, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Bypass paths of the delay checked and ruled out (the waiting time may be skipped).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/monad-0xba4dd672062de8feedb665dd4410658864483f1e.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $206M (DefiLlama), of which $74M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xba4dd672062de8feedb665dd4410658864483f1e on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xba4dd672062de8feedb665dd4410658864483f1e) on the Monad oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 71327646, methodology 0x4988d9ca0f320921…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.monad.xyz/ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000ba4dd672062de8feedb665dd4410658864483f1e"},"0x4405f9e"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (64 = 0x40); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.