Monad Native Bridge (Wormhole NTT) · authority risk 60/100, decent

Can one person move the money in Monad Native Bridge (Wormhole NTT) on Monad? The authority score is 60 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.

In short. The chain’s own officially blessed bridge, governed by a live-verified 13-of-19 Wormhole Guardian quorum - read directly from Monad’s own deployed Core Bridge contract, not assumed from generic docs.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key75
multisig100
timelock0
price feed100
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).

Why this score

The chain’s own officially blessed bridge, governed by a live-verified 13-of-19 Wormhole Guardian quorum - read directly from Monad’s own deployed Core Bridge contract, not assumed from generic docs.

composite 60 - 13-of-19 global guardian quorum

owner()/pauser() on the NTT Manager resolves to a small, non-upgradeable Wormhole governance relay that holds no independent power - it only forwards a call given a Guardian-signed message that clears quorum. getCurrentGuardianSetIndex()=7 and quorum(19)=13, both read live. No time delay: a valid quorum executes immediately.

4 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 50.00% (score 60). Cheapest path to strong (80): timelock from 0 to 65, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Monad Native Bridge (Wormhole NTT)](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fmonad%2F0x36878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/monad-0x36878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $1.0B (DefiLlama, the whole chain), of which $405M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x36878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x36878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95) on the Monad oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 71327646, methodology 0x4988d9ca0f320921…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Other hands: pauser() is a contract (0x574b7864119c9223a9870ea614dc91a8ee09e512). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.

Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x574b7864…e512 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Implementation behind the proxy: 0xe9eddb05ccb50c3d7935e82709623d2209350221 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (MultiTokenNtt, match, 0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (2 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x36878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x6c6c938"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x36878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 113690920 and 113690936 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 71327646, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.monad.xyz/ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000036878c6fca7e0e8a88f90dc410cfbbca5b695c95"},"0x4405f9e"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (60 = 0x3c); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.