Can one person move the money in Aave V3 Pool on Monad? The authority score is 49 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Same BGD Labs Aave Governance V3 pattern as Ethereum L1, Arbitrum, Base and Plasma: PoolAddressesProvider.owner() is an Executor owned by a PayloadsController that is owned by that same Executor, with a real 1-day delay on Level_1, the only configured tier. That delay does not bind every upgrade path: the ACLManager also gives POOL_ADMIN to the PROTOCOL_GUARDIAN Safe (4-of-7), which can swap a reserve’s aToken or debt-token implementation with no delay. Separately, the 5-of-9 guardian Safe that can cancel payloads has the same 9 signers as the guardians on Ethereum L1, Arbitrum, Base and Plasma, so one committee holds that seat on at least five chains.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 75 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 52 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Same BGD Labs Aave Governance V3 pattern as Ethereum L1, Arbitrum, Base and Plasma: PoolAddressesProvider.owner() is an Executor owned by a PayloadsController that is owned by that same Executor, with a real 1-day delay on Level_1, the only configured tier. That delay does not bind every upgrade path: the ACLManager also gives POOL_ADMIN to the PROTOCOL_GUARDIAN Safe (4-of-7), which can swap a reserve’s aToken or debt-token implementation with no delay. Separately, the 5-of-9 guardian Safe that can cancel payloads has the same 9 signers as the guardians on Ethereum L1, Arbitrum, Base and Plasma, so one committee holds that seat on at least five chains.
PROTOCOL_GUARDIAN Safe holds POOL_ADMIN, cross-exposure: 80
Level_1 has an 86,400s delay and all payloads created so far were executed at least that long after queueing, while Level_2 reads the zero address with a 0s delay here (Ethereum L1 has a Level_2 executor with a 7-day delay). The DAO path covers the Monad-side Executor and PayloadsController, whose message originator is Ethereum’s Aave Governance V3 core (chain id 1); that Ethereum root itself was not re-verified here. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20 (Monad testnet block 64022942; previously 65 / 100 / 50 with composite 71): the ACLManager, read live through getACLManager(), reports isPoolAdmin and isEmergencyAdmin both true for the PROTOCOL_GUARDIAN Safe, a 4-of-7 (four bare-EOA owners and three nested 1-of-3 Safes) whose 7 owners are identical to Ethereum L1’s PROTOCOL_GUARDIAN and to the emergency-admin Safes on Arbitrum, Base and Plasma. isPoolAdmin lets it upgrade every reserve’s aToken and variableDebtToken implementation at once (state-override simulation, 2026-09-19), so the 1-day Executor delay does not bind it. The Executor holds DEFAULT_ADMIN and can revoke the seat, and the Safe cannot grant roles; both are disclosed and not score inputs. The scorer therefore applies the Safe-with-no-timelock rule: admin key 65 (threshold of 3 or more, never raised above the DAO-path value), multisig 75 (4 × 15 + 3 × 5), timelock 0, composite 49. If the Safe is confirmed not to hold isPoolAdmin it falls back to the DAO-path scoring (65 / 100 / 50), and if the seat cannot be read it degrades to 20 / 20 / 0. Cross-exposure is 80 while the 9-signer guardian committee matches.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 49 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 93, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/monad-0x34793fb9935f7bb5e5ae920fb963f39063e7a615.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $399M (DefiLlama), of which $204M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x34793fb9935f7bb5e5ae920fb963f39063e7a615 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x34793fb9935f7bb5e5ae920fb963f39063e7a615) on the Monad oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 71327646, methodology 0x4988d9ca0f320921…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0xa9d0eaff…f6a2 via owner() -> owner() of the holder (contract), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is another contract 0x442ca936e5e6db875357d0a16481145c96dd9a82: that is the hand. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x34793fb9935f7bb5e5ae920fb963f39063e7a615","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x6c6c938"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 113690920 and 113690936 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.monad.xyz/ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000034793fb9935f7bb5e5ae920fb963f39063e7a615"},"0x4405f9e"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (49 = 0x31); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.