Can one person move the money in Hyperliquid L1 (HyperCore validator set) on Hyperliquid? The authority score is 26 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
In short. Validators auto-pull a signed node binary with no public node source and no documented upgrade notice. Five validators labeled Hyper Foundation hold 47.98% of active stake, enough to halt but not to finalize alone.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 15 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 65 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 40 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Validators auto-pull a signed node binary with no public node source and no documented upgrade notice. Five validators labeled Hyper Foundation hold 47.98% of active stake, enough to halt but not to finalize alone.
caps every other Hyperliquid target
The repo reads the effective admin key as the binary signing key held by the core contributors, gated by validator adoption. No minimum upgrade notice is documented anywhere; a documented search on 2026-09-19 found none. At the 2026-09-16 read, 27 of 35 registered validators were active and the 5 Foundation-labeled ones count as 1 entity. The labels are self-set, so merging them is the conservative choice. The 4 entities needed for 2/3 hold only 0.04 points more than 2/3, so a small stake shift would make it 5 and raise the score. HyperCore reads rest on one operator's API.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 26 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 15 to 50, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/hyperliquid-0xea394cd63ca3a5c8a130bb2b955cc71c22e5ea6c.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $6.4B (DefiLlama), of which $4.7B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xea394cd63ca3a5c8a130bb2b955cc71c22e5ea6c. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xea394cd63ca3a5c8a130bb2b955cc71c22e5ea6c) on the Hyperliquid oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 66993098, methodology 0x36452ea42a84016f…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no code at this address on the chain's mainnet: a derived identifier for a native (non-EVM) entity such as HyperCore, or a contract that lives on another chain (a rollup's own L1 contracts); nothing for this reader to compare here). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-12: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://998.rpc.thirdweb.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000ea394cd63ca3a5c8a130bb2b955cc71c22e5ea6c"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (26 = 0x1a); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.