Unit UBTC, UETH and USOL treasuries (0x8daf…35c0) · authority risk 9/100, critical

Can one person move the money in Unit UBTC, UETH and USOL treasuries on Hyperliquid? The authority score is 9 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.

In short. Each treasury is one HyperCore key holding over 99.9% of the token's max supply. HIP-1 has no mint after genesis, so this balance is the effective mint authority. Unit's 2-of-3 MPC claim cannot be verified on chain.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key10
multisig15
timelock0
price feed100
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).

Why this score

Each treasury is one HyperCore key holding over 99.9% of the token's max supply. HIP-1 has no mint after genesis, so this balance is the effective mint authority. Unit's 2-of-3 MPC claim cannot be verified on chain.

on-chain single key vs documented 2-of-3 MPC

The treasuries hold 99.9669%, 99.9411% and 99.9286% of max supply for UBTC, UETH and USOL, and each reads as a plain single key. Tokens it sends are indistinguishable from backed ones on HyperCore, and they serve as collateral elsewhere: HyperLend lists all three. Unit's docs say the key is a 2-of-3 threshold signature held by Unit, Hyperliquid and Infinite Field; that is recorded as context, not scored, because the chain cannot confirm it. The three share one token deployer (a native 2-of-3 multisig at a different address), a real correlation not counted in cross-exposure.

2 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 9 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 10 to 38, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Unit UBTC, UETH and USOL treasuries](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fhyperliquid-hyperevm%2F0x8dafbe89302656a7df43c470e9ebcb4c540835c0.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/hyperliquid-0x8dafbe89302656a7df43c470e9ebcb4c540835c0.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $977M (DefiLlama, all chains), of which $889M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x8dafbe89302656a7df43c470e9ebcb4c540835c0. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x8dafbe89302656a7df43c470e9ebcb4c540835c0) on the Hyperliquid oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 66993098, methodology 0x36452ea42a84016f…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no code at this address on the chain's mainnet: a derived identifier for a native (non-EVM) entity such as HyperCore, or a contract that lives on another chain (a rollup's own L1 contracts); nothing for this reader to compare here). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-12: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (latest block: this RPC cannot replay the block of the build, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://998.rpc.thirdweb.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000008dafbe89302656a7df43c470e9ebcb4c540835c0"},"latest"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (9 = 0x9); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.