Can one person move the money in para StakingVault (HyperEVM) on Hyperliquid? The authority score is 4 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. A HYPE staking vault, about $41.7M delegated at the 2026-09-17 read. Every fund-moving function sits behind MANAGER_ROLE, held by a proxy with an unverified implementation, so the score treats it as the binding constraint.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 10 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A HYPE staking vault, about $41.7M delegated at the 2026-09-17 read. Every fund-moving function sits behind MANAGER_ROLE, held by a proxy with an unverified implementation, so the score treats it as the binding constraint.
unverified MANAGER_ROLE holder binds the score
That is 500,801 HYPE delegated to validators. Access control is deferred to an external RoleRegistry: its owner, a 1-of-1 Safe, can upgrade the vault and grant roles, and OPERATOR_ROLE is a separate 1-of-3 Safe that counts the owner Safe among its signers. MANAGER_ROLE gates deposit, stake, unstake, spotSend and the other fund-moving calls, and its holder's implementation was deliberately not reverse-engineered. If it is itself gated by the RoleRegistry owner, real risk may be lower; not assumed either way. Ventuals has the same design but verified source, and scores much higher. No dex-admin path was found.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 4 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 10 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/hyperliquid-0x8888888c43cbb7e1c4132542e46831bffd866ed3.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count); the protocol's total value locked (no DefiLlama match).
Contract: 0x8888888c43cbb7e1c4132542e46831bffd866ed3. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x8888888c43cbb7e1c4132542e46831bffd866ed3) on the Hyperliquid oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 66993098, methodology 0x36452ea42a84016f…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-12: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://998.rpc.thirdweb.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000008888888c43cbb7e1c4132542e46831bffd866ed3"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (4 = 0x4); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.