Can one person move the money in HyperLend Pooled (Aave v3 fork) on Hyperliquid? The authority score is 61 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. Upgrades sit behind a 7-day timelock and risk and listing changes behind a 6-hour one, each proposed by a 4-of-8 Safe and executed by a separate 5-of-9 Safe. The score follows the weaker 6-hour path.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 80 |
| timelock | 35 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Upgrades sit behind a 7-day timelock and risk and listing changes behind a 6-hour one, each proposed by a 4-of-8 Safe and executed by a separate 5-of-9 Safe. The score follows the weaker 6-hour path.
L1 cap binds: 61 becomes 26
Timelock A (7 days) covers pool upgrades, POOL_ADMIN and ACL admin; Timelock B (6 hours) covers RISK_ADMIN and ASSET_LISTING_ADMIN (caps, new listings). The proposing Governance Safe and executing Treasury Safe share no owner and execution is not open to anyone: mitigating, not scored. EMERGENCY_ADMIN is two Safes (3-of-8 and 4-of-6) with no delay that can pause but, per Aave v3 semantics, not move funds; 5 of the 8 Governance signers also sign the 3-of-8 one. Not traced: the price feeds behind the oracle. Listed reserves inherit Kinetiq kHYPE and Unit treasury authority. DefiLlama TVL about $474.3M (2026-09-17).
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 50.75% (score 61). Cheapest path to strong (80): timelock from 35 to 99, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/hyperliquid-0x72c98246a98bfe64022a3190e7710e157497170c.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $334M (DefiLlama), of which $130M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x72c98246a98bfe64022a3190e7710e157497170c. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x72c98246a98bfe64022a3190e7710e157497170c) on the Hyperliquid oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 66993098, methodology 0x36452ea42a84016f…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x0a0d1d19…5d42 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-15. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-12: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x72c98246a98bfe64022a3190e7710e157497170c","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://998.rpc.thirdweb.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000072c98246a98bfe64022a3190e7710e157497170c"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (61 = 0x3d); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.