Can one person move the money in Kinetiq kHYPE StakingManager (HyperEVM) on Hyperliquid? The authority score is 4 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. Kinetiq's flagship staking manager, about $1.05B of DefiLlama TVL at the 2026-09-17 read. Admin roles sit with a 4-of-8 Safe, but a bare EOA holds OPERATOR_ROLE and binds the score. Its oracle push is size-capped.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 10 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 15 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 4 keys, 0 h to react, about $219M behind one key.
Kinetiq's flagship staking manager, about $1.05B of DefiLlama TVL at the 2026-09-17 read. Admin roles sit with a 4-of-8 Safe, but a bare EOA holds OPERATOR_ROLE and binds the score. Its oracle push is size-capped.
same root Safe as kmHYPE and mkts, not in the score
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and MANAGER_ROLE are held by a 4-of-8 Safe with no module, no guard and no delay; TREASURY_ROLE and SENTINEL_ROLE have no holder. The bare-EOA operator can push a report once per validator per 24 h, but a sanity checker caps each push at 3 bps of reward and 1 bp of slash and rejects a balance more than 300 bps from the L1 read. The Safe can loosen or remove the checker with no delay. The same Safe roots kmHYPE and mkts, a real concentration not counted in the score. OPERATOR_ROLE's gated functions were inferred from kmHYPE, not read line by line.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 4 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 10 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/hyperliquid-0x393d0b87ed38fc779fd9611144ae649ba6082109.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $876M (DefiLlama), of which $841M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x393d0b87ed38fc779fd9611144ae649ba6082109. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x393d0b87ed38fc779fd9611144ae649ba6082109) on the Hyperliquid oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 66993098, methodology 0x36452ea42a84016f…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x18a8…f8f1 has executed 75 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-14). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 4-of-8 of 4 plain keys, 4 not read; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 4-of-8 0x18a8…f8f…f8f1 via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(), disagrees with the published score: the score says one key does everything (10), the live read finds a Safe 4-of-8 via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(); the multisig score says no real multisig (0), the live read finds a Safe 4-of-8 via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(). Unchanged since 2026-10-13. The attacker's question: 4 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $219M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 4 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 4 plain keys, 4 not read. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x23fda3b9f944dbeaf2dcd5e7b9f8207b102c933f (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (StakingManagerRouter, exact match, 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $919M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x71f0019c… on Hyperliquid. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-12: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x393d0b87ed38fc779fd9611144ae649ba6082109","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","latest"]}'
# owner() on the address the slot returned (a ProxyAdmin): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<address from the slot>","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x393d0b87ed38fc779fd9611144ae649ba6082109","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://998.rpc.thirdweb.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000393d0b87ed38fc779fd9611144ae649ba6082109"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (4 = 0x4); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.