Can one person move the money in Legacy USDC bridge (Bridge2, Arbitrum One) on Hyperliquid? The authority score is 48 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. A non-upgradeable contract governed by a 3-of-4 set of unidentified keys with a 200 s dispute window. The last live read recorded over $544M still held, though the docs call it deprecated in favor of Circle CCTP.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 59 |
| timelock | 15 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A non-upgradeable contract governed by a 3-of-4 set of unidentified keys with a 200 s dispute window. The last live read recorded over $544M still held, though the docs call it deprecated in favor of Circle CCTP.
unresolved: 4-key set vs 27 active validators
Withdrawals and admin changes need more than 2/3 of an equal-weight hot or cold set, currently 4 keys installed at epoch 7 by an emergencyUnlock transaction. Any 2 lockers can pause a pending change within the 200 s window. None of the 8 bridge keys matches any of the 35 registered L1 validator or signer addresses. Why the set is a fixed 4-key committee instead of tracking the 27 active validators, an intentional freeze or a sync that stopped, cannot be told from chain data and is left unresolved. Docs say the bridge holds under 10% of HyperCore USDC.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 48 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 94, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/hyperliquid-0x2df1c51e09aecf9cacb7bc98cb1742757f163df7.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $399M (DefiLlama), of which $207M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x2df1c51e09aecf9cacb7bc98cb1742757f163df7. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x2df1c51e09aecf9cacb7bc98cb1742757f163df7) on the Hyperliquid oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 66993098, methodology 0x36452ea42a84016f…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no code at this address on the chain's mainnet: a derived identifier for a native (non-EVM) entity such as HyperCore, or a contract that lives on another chain (a rollup's own L1 contracts); nothing for this reader to compare here). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-12: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://998.rpc.thirdweb.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000002df1c51e09aecf9cacb7bc98cb1742757f163df7"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (48 = 0x30); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.