Can one person move the money in Morpho Vault V2: Steakhouse Prime EURCV (Ethereum L1) on Ethereum? The authority score is 73 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. The owner is a VaultV2Supervisor whose owner is Steakhouse's 5-of-10 Safe, the same Safe that owns four of the Morpho V1 vaults tracked here; the curator is a 3-of-9 Safe. Every fund-redirecting action sits behind a 7-day timelock, and several exit gates are permanently abdicated.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 70 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 75 |
| timelock | 75 |
| price feed | 52 |
| shared control | 40 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 0 h to react, about $30M behind one key.
The owner is a VaultV2Supervisor whose owner is Steakhouse's 5-of-10 Safe, the same Safe that owns four of the Morpho V1 vaults tracked here; the curator is a 3-of-9 Safe. Every fund-redirecting action sits behind a 7-day timelock, and several exit gates are permanently abdicated.
5-of-10 owner Safe, 7-day timelock, composite 73
Pushed on-chain 2026-10-10. Scored 70 / 75 / 75 with an oracle-authority score of 52, the weakest controller among the price paths that carry at least 1% of the vault: a Chainlink proxy owner, a 4-of-9 Safe with no timelock above it. The send-assets gate is the one exit gate not abdicated: the curator controls it behind a 7-day timelock. The sister vault Steakhouse Prime USDC has the same owner and curator Safes.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 59.75% (score 73). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 70 to 87, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Price feed not under one hand (one party controls the price).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0xbeef0c075da5d01112ae5cf34d257074fb5ddb2f.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $151M (DefiLlama), of which $41M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xbeef0c075da5d01112ae5cf34d257074fb5ddb2f on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xbeef0c075da5d01112ae5cf34d257074fb5ddb2f) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: curator() is a Safe 3-of-9 (0x827e…ecdb). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x0a0e…f8dd has executed 139 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-10 behind a bare contract; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x4d7bd498…f71d via owner() -> owner() of the holder (safe 5-of-10), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is a Safe 5-of-10: that is the hand. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $30M behind each key ($151M of EURCV held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract: 0xbeef0880… on Ethereum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score over time (2 points, 2026-10-10 to 2026-10-13, from the chained log): 73 to 73 Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xbeef0c075da5d01112ae5cf34d257074fb5ddb2f","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000beef0c075da5d01112ae5cf34d257074fb5ddb2f"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (73 = 0x49); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.