Lido stETH · authority risk 80/100, strong

Can one person move the money in Lido stETH on Ethereum? The authority score is 80 / 100 (strong): a multisig behind a long delay.

In short. stETH is an Aragon app proxy whose Agent is now controlled through Dual Governance: the Aragon Voting app no longer holds EXECUTE_ROLE on the Agent, an executor behind a 4-day enforced delay does. A configured emergency-governance path exists and was not fully bounded, so the delay is not credited in full.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key80
multisig100
timelock60
price feed95
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).

Why this score

stETH is an Aragon app proxy whose Agent is now controlled through Dual Governance: the Aragon Voting app no longer holds EXECUTE_ROLE on the Agent, an executor behind a 4-day enforced delay does. A configured emergency-governance path exists and was not fully bounded, so the delay is not credited in full.

$25.2B TVL, 4-day enforced delay, composite 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)

Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20 as target index 15 (Sepolia block 11745959, tx 0xc4873381…ba46). Scored 80 / 100 / 60 with an oracle-authority score of 95 (stETH’s share rate is itself set by a reporting committee) and crossExposure 100. Traced live on 2 RPCs. See chains/ethereum-l1/scorers.py, score_lido_steth().

5 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths not all checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 65.00% (score 80). Already in the top band.

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Lido stETH](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fethereum-l1-sepolia%2F0xae7ab96520de3a18e5e111b5eaab095312d7fe84.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0xae7ab96520de3a18e5e111b5eaab095312d7fe84.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $23.6B (DefiLlama), of which $4.7B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xae7ab96520de3a18e5e111b5eaab095312d7fe84 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xae7ab96520de3a18e5e111b5eaab095312d7fe84) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 11922317, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000ae7ab96520de3a18e5e111b5eaab095312d7fe84"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (80 = 0x50); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.