Can one person move the money in USDC (Circle FiatTokenProxy) on Ethereum? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. The proxy admin, the owner, the blacklister and the pauser are all accounts with no code, and so is the owner of the masterMinter contract. Any of them can upgrade, blacklist, pause or set minters, with no delay.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react.
The proxy admin, the owner, the blacklister and the pauser are all accounts with no code, and so is the owner of the masterMinter contract. Any of them can upgrade, blacklist, pause or set minters, with no delay.
accounts with no code, no timelock, composite 2
Added 2026-10-11. Scored 5 / 0 / 0 (composite 2): the componentwise minimum over five controllers, all read on two independent RPCs the same day. Whether one key, an HSM or an MPC service holds an account with no code cannot be observed on chain; the score treats it as a bare EOA, the methodology's convention. The implementation slot holds 0x4350…02dd, so the logic can be replaced by the proxy admin. This reads who holds the controls, not how they are operated: it is a statement about on-chain authority, not a prediction of loss.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count); the protocol's total value locked (no DefiLlama match).
Contract: 0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: pauser() is a plain key (0x4914…8566). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Read live: admin: a plain key, 6 transactions sent; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) 0xfcb1…ae3…ae3a via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-11. This key has sent 6 transactions. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score over time (2 points, 2026-10-11 to 2026-10-13, from the chained log): 2 to 2 Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# eth_getCode on the holder: 0x means a plain key
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'
# eth_getTransactionCount on the holder: how many transactions this key has sent (6 at the read)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000a0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (2 = 0x2); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.