Can one person move the money in EigenLayer StrategyManager on Ethereum? The authority score is 60 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. The proxy admin’s owner is a Safe with a threshold of 1 over two owners: a TimelockController with a 10-day delay, and a 9-of-13 Safe. Either owner alone can upgrade, so the 10-day delay is the normal path, not a guarantee.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 60 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 20 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 9 keys, 0 h to react, about $702M behind one key.
The proxy admin’s owner is a Safe with a threshold of 1 over two owners: a TimelockController with a 10-day delay, and a 9-of-13 Safe. Either owner alone can upgrade, so the 10-day delay is the normal path, not a guarantee.
$6.87B TVL, 9-of-13 Safe bypasses the 10-day delay
Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20 as target index 16 (same transaction). Scored 60 / 100 / 20: timelock 20 because the 9-of-13 Safe can execute the same upgrade with no delay. No Safe module is enabled on the executor Safe, so there is no third path. See score_eigenlayer_strategy_manager().
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 50.00% (score 60). Cheapest path to strong (80): timelock from 20 to 85, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x858646372cc42e1a627fce94aa7a7033e7cf075a.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $6.3B (DefiLlama), of which $2.5B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x858646372cc42e1a627fce94aa7a7033e7cf075a on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x858646372cc42e1a627fce94aa7a7033e7cf075a) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x369e…9111 has executed 32 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 1-of-2 of 1 timelock, 1 Safe; delay: a timelock among the signers.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 1-of-2, whose owners are timelock, safe 9-of-13 (a routing layer, not a key) 0x369e…911…9111 via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 9 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $702M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 1 key collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 1 timelock, 1 Safe. Implementation behind the proxy: 0xa7536c85898dc424c6bfe8592f983661f830656a (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (StrategyManager, exact match, 0.8.30+commit.73712a01). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x858646372cc42e1a627fce94aa7a7033e7cf075a","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","latest"]}'
# owner() on the address the slot returned (a ProxyAdmin): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<address from the slot>","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x858646372cc42e1a627fce94aa7a7033e7cf075a","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000858646372cc42e1a627fce94aa7a7033e7cf075a"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (60 = 0x3c); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.