Adpend USDC (adpUSDC) · authority risk 2/100, critical

Can one person move the money in Adpend USDC (adpUSDC) on Ethereum? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key5
multisig0
timelock0
price feed31
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 1 key, 336 h to react, about $561M behind one key.

1 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Adpend USDC (adpUSDC)](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fethereum-l1-sepolia%2F0x55555815a5595991c3a0ff119b59aef6c8b55555.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x55555815a5595991c3a0ff119b59aef6c8b55555.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $561M (DefiLlama), of which $550M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x55555815a5595991c3a0ff119b59aef6c8b55555 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x55555815a5595991c3a0ff119b59aef6c8b55555) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Other hands: curator() is a plain key (0xf630…a997). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.

Read live: admin: a plain key (EIP-7702: its account runs the code of 0x63c0…e32b), 70 transactions sent; delay: 336 h the contract enforces itself.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) 0xf630…a99…a997 via owner(), disagrees with the published score: the timelock score says no delay (0), the contract enforces its own timelock of 336 h (timelock()). Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The account carries an EIP-7702 delegation to 0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b: still one key, now running that code (a smart wallet), which can be changed by the key alone. This key has sent 70 transactions. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, 336 h to react, $561M behind each key ($561M of USDC held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). The contract enforces its own timelock of 336 h (timelock()). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (3 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x55555815a5595991c3a0ff119b59aef6c8b55555","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# eth_getCode on the holder: 0x means a plain key
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'
# eth_getTransactionCount on the holder: how many transactions this key has sent (70 at the read)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 11922317, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000055555815a5595991c3a0ff119b59aef6c8b55555"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (2 = 0x2); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.