Can one person move the money in Aave V3 Ethereum Pool on Ethereum? The authority score is 78 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. PoolAddressesProvider.owner() closes into a mutual-pointer EXECUTOR/PayloadsController pair (BGD Labs’ Aave Governance V3), with a real confirmed 1-day per-access-level delay.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 78 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 55 |
| price feed | 52 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
PoolAddressesProvider.owner() closes into a mutual-pointer EXECUTOR/PayloadsController pair (BGD Labs’ Aave Governance V3), with a real confirmed 1-day per-access-level delay.
$14.77B TVL, cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)
The exact same authority shape as Aave’s Arbitrum and Base deployments below, by design the same official BGD Labs infrastructure reused across every chain Aave governs. A GOVERNANCE_GUARDIAN Safe can veto/cancel payloads outside the normal timelock path. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: both emergency committees on this deployment are also tracked on other chains. The PayloadsController.guardian() Safe has 9 signers identical to the guardian committee on Arbitrum, Base, Plasma and Monad, and the PROTOCOL_GUARDIAN Safe (4-of-7, the ACLManager’s EMERGENCY_ADMIN holder) has 7 signers identical to the emergency-admin Safes on the same four chains. The scorer compares each freshly read owner set against a dated snapshot and folds the overlap into crossExposureScore as a flat 80, applied once even though both committees match; no other score moves.
Exit window: a delay with a bounded bypass, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 63.50% (score 78). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 78 to 83, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x2f39d218133afab8f2b819b1066c7e434ad94e9e.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $14.2B (DefiLlama), of which $3.1B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x2f39d218133afab8f2b819b1066c7e434ad94e9e on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x2f39d218133afab8f2b819b1066c7e434ad94e9e) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x5300a1a1…192a via owner() -> owner() of the holder (contract), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is another contract 0xdabad81af85554e9ae636395611c58f7ec1aaec5: that is the hand. This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $14.2B behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x5d39e06b… on Ethereum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x2f39d218133afab8f2b819b1066c7e434ad94e9e","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000002f39d218133afab8f2b819b1066c7e434ad94e9e"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (78 = 0x4e); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.