Can one person move the money in Ethena EthenaMinting (retired minter) on Ethereum? The authority score is 52 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. This contract was USDe’s minter until 2024-07-08 and has been inert since: USDe.mint() called from it reverts, and it holds no collateral. Its owner is the 5-of-10 Safe directly, with no delay, which is what its on-chain entry still reads (55/100/0, composite 52, last written by the 2026-09-19 push).
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 20 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 0 h to react.
This contract was USDe’s minter until 2024-07-08 and has been inert since: USDe.mint() called from it reverts, and it holds no collateral. Its owner is the 5-of-10 Safe directly, with no delay, which is what its on-chain entry still reads (55/100/0, composite 52, last written by the 2026-09-19 push).
retired 2026-09-20, stale historical reading, no longer refreshed
Found by the unscored-role sweep: USDe.minter() has pointed at a different EthenaMinting (the idx 14 card, USDe live minter) since block 20261016, and re-pointing it here would need USDe.setMinter, which sits behind the 24h timelock. The oracle has no removal function, so this target is retired by ceasing to refresh it: the 2026-09-20 push wrote the live minter as index 14 (Ethereum L1 now tracks 15 targets, 14 of them refreshed) and left index 3 untouched. Its on-chain entry stays as a historical reading and turns stale nine days after its last update, which was the 2026-09-19 push. The old number was right about this contract and irrelevant to USDe.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): it would revert (StaleScore): the score is older than the oracle allows. Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 55 to 74, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x2cc440b721d2cafd6d64908d6d8c4acc57f8afc3.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: a fresh score: the one shown is older than the oracle's staleness window; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count); the protocol's total value locked (no DefiLlama match).
Contract: 0x2cc440b721d2cafd6d64908d6d8c4acc57f8afc3 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-09-23; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x2cc440b721d2cafd6d64908d6d8c4acc57f8afc3) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0xac9104d9774a01ae…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x3b0a…1862 has executed 745 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-12). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-10 of 10 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 5-of-10 0x3b0a…186…1862 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Retired contract: the protocol's TVL does not sit behind it (data/tvl_scope.json); no money is counted here. 5 keys collude to act; 6 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 10 plain keys. Transaction guard: 0x74abe7805541c28f31953b3cda9711dc96278d29 (a contract, owned by 0xa075…c344, a contract) (checks every execution; a guard can also block the owners). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-09-23; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x2cc440b721d2cafd6d64908d6d8c4acc57f8afc3","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000002cc440b721d2cafd6d64908d6d8c4acc57f8afc3"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (52 = 0x34); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.