Can one person move the money in Moonwell Comptroller (Unitroller) on Base? The authority score is 71 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. Unitroller.admin() is a TemporalGovernor whose only trusted Wormhole sender is one Ethereum address, Moonwell’s MultichainGovernor V2 proxy, and it executes that sender’s messages after a 1-day delay. A 3-of-5 guardian Safe can pause once and then fast-track a valid message past that delay.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 50 |
| price feed | 52 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $4M behind one key.
Unitroller.admin() is a TemporalGovernor whose only trusted Wormhole sender is one Ethereum address, Moonwell’s MultichainGovernor V2 proxy, and it executes that sender’s messages after a 1-day delay. A 3-of-5 guardian Safe can pause once and then fast-track a valid message past that delay.
$14.0M Base TVL, guardian can fast-track past the delay
The scorer caps the timelock score at 50 for that guardian path, and the Ethereum-side governor (quorum, proxy admin) and Wormhole’s own guardian set were not verified by this Base-only scorer. In the Comptroller source the pauseGuardian (3-of-5 Safe) can only pause mint, borrow, transfer and seize, with unpausing reserved to the admin, and the borrow and supply cap guardian (2-of-4 Safe) can only set market caps, both disclosed but not scored. crossExposureScore 100 means not computed for this target, not a confirmed clean result.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 58.25% (score 71). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 65 to 87, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/base-0xfbb21d0380bee3312b33c4353c8936a0f13ef26c.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $11M (DefiLlama), of which $3M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xfbb21d0380bee3312b33c4353c8936a0f13ef26c on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xfbb21d0380bee3312b33c4353c8936a0f13ef26c) on the Base oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 48160953, methodology 0x0ffe08e65a4a36a2…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: pauseGuardian() is a Safe 3-of-5 (0xb9d4acf113a423bc4a64110b8738a52e51c2ab38). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x4463…779e has executed 6 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 3-of-5 behind a bare contract; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x8b621804…7d51 via admin() -> owner() of the holder (safe 3-of-5), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is a Safe 3-of-5: that is the hand. The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $4M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# admin() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xfbb21d0380bee3312b33c4353c8936a0f13ef26c","data":"0xf851a440"},"0x32362db"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 52650708 and 52650715 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000fbb21d0380bee3312b33c4353c8936a0f13ef26c"},"0x2dee0b9"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (71 = 0x47); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.