Aave V3 Base · authority risk 71/100, decent

Can one person move the money in Aave V3 Base on Base? The authority score is 71 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.

In short. Same BGD Labs Aave Governance V3 pattern as Arbitrum and Ethereum L1, real 1-day delay - and the mirror of Arbitrum’s cross-chain finding: this guardian Safe is the identical 9-of-9 owner set at 5-of-9 threshold as Arbitrum’s own.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key65
multisig100
timelock50
price feed52
shared control80

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).

Why this score

Same BGD Labs Aave Governance V3 pattern as Arbitrum and Ethereum L1, real 1-day delay - and the mirror of Arbitrum’s cross-chain finding: this guardian Safe is the identical 9-of-9 owner set at 5-of-9 threshold as Arbitrum’s own.

cross-exposure: 80 - shared committee with Arbitrum

$500.8M TVL. The Ethereum-mainnet Aave DAO root (proposal counts, quorum) is out of scope for this Base-only scorer - see the Ethereum L1 tab’s own Aave card for that root directly.

2 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 58.25% (score 71). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 65 to 87, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Aave V3 Base](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fbase-sepolia%2F0xe20fcbdbffc4dd138ce8b2e6fbb6cb49777ad64d.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/base-0xe20fcbdbffc4dd138ce8b2e6fbb6cb49777ad64d.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $552M (DefiLlama), of which $160M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xe20fcbdbffc4dd138ce8b2e6fbb6cb49777ad64d on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xe20fcbdbffc4dd138ce8b2e6fbb6cb49777ad64d) on the Base oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 48160953, methodology 0x0ffe08e65a4a36a2…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x9390b173…257a via owner() -> owner() of the holder (contract), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is another contract 0x2dc219e716793fb4b21548c0f009ba3af753ab01: that is the hand. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (1 public RPC call, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe20fcbdbffc4dd138ce8b2e6fbb6cb49777ad64d","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x32362db"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 52650708 and 52650715 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 48160953, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000e20fcbdbffc4dd138ce8b2e6fbb6cb49777ad64d"},"0x2dee0b9"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (71 = 0x47); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.