Can one person move the money in Aerodrome Slipstream CLFactory on Base? The authority score is 46 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. owner(), swapFeeManager() and unstakedFeeManager() all resolve to one 3-of-7 Safe with no timelock, the same Safe that controls Aerodrome V1 (pauser, feeManager and Voter.governor()), so one signer set governs both Aerodrome pool factories.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 65 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $76M behind one key.
owner(), swapFeeManager() and unstakedFeeManager() all resolve to one 3-of-7 Safe with no timelock, the same Safe that controls Aerodrome V1 (pauser, feeManager and Voter.governor()), so one signer set governs both Aerodrome pool factories.
cross-exposure: 80, same Safe as Aerodrome V1
In the deployed CLFactory source the owner can set the owner and enable tick spacings (fee up to 10%), the swap fee manager sets a swap fee module (accepted up to 10%), and the unstaked fee manager sets an unstaked fee module (accepted up to 100%) and the default unstaked fee (capped at 50%); pools are EIP-1167 clones of an immutable implementation, so there is no pool upgrade path. Adding this target put two tracked targets on one Safe, which is why Aerodrome V1’s crossExposure went from 100 to 80 while its composite stayed 46.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 46 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 100, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/base-0x5e7bb104d84c7cb9b682aac2f3d509f5f406809a.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $228M (DefiLlama), of which $123M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x5e7bb104d84c7cb9b682aac2f3d509f5f406809a on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x5e7bb104d84c7cb9b682aac2f3d509f5f406809a) on the Base oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 48160953, methodology 0x0ffe08e65a4a36a2…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xe6a4…2075 has executed 2733 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-15). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 3-of-7 of 7 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 3-of-7 0xe6a4…207…2075 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $76M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 3 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 7 plain keys. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x5e7bb104d84c7cb9b682aac2f3d509f5f406809a","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x32362db"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 52650708 and 52650715 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000005e7bb104d84c7cb9b682aac2f3d509f5f406809a"},"0x2dee0b9"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (46 = 0x2e); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.