Can one person move the money in Aerodrome Finance PoolFactory on Base? The authority score is 46 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. pauser()/feeManager() AND Voter.governor() are confirmed the exact same 3-of-7 Safe - one key can pause pools, redirect where AERO emissions flow, and reassign itself, with no timelock anywhere.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 65 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
pauser()/feeManager() AND Voter.governor() are confirmed the exact same 3-of-7 Safe - one key can pause pools, redirect where AERO emissions flow, and reassign itself, with no timelock anywhere.
$322.7M TVL - largest Base-native target
A separate, genuinely distinct emergencyCouncil Safe (3-of-5, zero owner overlap, re-checked live every run) also exists - but its only powers (killGauge/reviveGauge) are bounded: one gauge at a time, reversible, cannot touch other gauges or move claimed funds. Disclosed, not folded into the composite, the same restrict-only convention this project already applies to Kamino’s emergency council on Solana.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 46 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 100, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/base-0x420dd381b31aef6683db6b902084cb0ffece40da.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $144M (DefiLlama), of which $78M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x420dd381b31aef6683db6b902084cb0ffece40da on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x420dd381b31aef6683db6b902084cb0ffece40da) on the Base oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 48160953, methodology 0x0ffe08e65a4a36a2…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: pauser() is a Safe 3-of-7 (0xe6a4…2075). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000420dd381b31aef6683db6b902084cb0ffece40da"},"0x2dee0b9"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (46 = 0x2e); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.