Can one person move the money in Aave V3 Pool (Arbitrum) on Arbitrum? The authority score is 71 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. Same BGD Labs Aave Governance V3 pattern as the Ethereum L1 and Base deployments, real 1-day delay - plus a live cross-chain finding: its GOVERNANCE_GUARDIAN Safe shares the identical 9 owners at 5-of-9 with Base’s own Aave guardian Safe.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 50 |
| price feed | 52 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Same BGD Labs Aave Governance V3 pattern as the Ethereum L1 and Base deployments, real 1-day delay - plus a live cross-chain finding: its GOVERNANCE_GUARDIAN Safe shares the identical 9 owners at 5-of-9 with Base’s own Aave guardian Safe.
cross-exposure: 80 - shared committee with Base
$489.2M supplied, the largest Arbitrum TVL scouted. The guardian committee comparison is against a dated 2026-09-17 snapshot of Base’s owner set (re-verified via a dedicated script, not on every push) - a CREATE2-redeployed shared committee, the same pattern this project’s sister research (multisig-overlap) already documented for ether.fi/Curve, found live here for the first time in this project’s own tracked targets.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 58.25% (score 71). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 65 to 87, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/arbitrum-0xa97684ead0e402dc232d5a977953df7ecbab3cdb.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $540M (DefiLlama), of which $157M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xa97684ead0e402dc232d5a977953df7ecbab3cdb on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xa97684ead0e402dc232d5a977953df7ecbab3cdb) on the Arbitrum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 319507783, methodology 0x51163f3cce461201…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0xff113724…6327 via owner() -> owner() of the holder (contract), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is another contract 0x89644ca1bb8064760312ae4f03ea41b05da3637c: that is the hand. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xa97684ead0e402dc232d5a977953df7ecbab3cdb","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 515148086 and 515148107 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia-rollup.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000a97684ead0e402dc232d5a977953df7ecbab3cdb"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (71 = 0x47); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.