Compound V3 · authority risk 78/100, decent

Can one person move the money in Compound V3 on Arbitrum? The authority score is 78 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.

In short. Governor, proxy admin and configurator all resolve to one LocalTimelock (1-day delay) whose admin is Compound’s ArbitrumBridgeReceiver, relaying Compound’s Ethereum-mainnet DAO timelock.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key75
multisig100
timelock60
price feed52
shared control80

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.

Why this score

Governor, proxy admin and configurator all resolve to one LocalTimelock (1-day delay) whose admin is Compound’s ArbitrumBridgeReceiver, relaying Compound’s Ethereum-mainnet DAO timelock.

L1 DAO via bridge receiver

Same shape as the Base Comet, re-derived live against roots.json. A 5-of-9 pauseGuardian Safe can pause outside the timelock (pause only, disclosed, not scored).

3 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths not all checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 63.50% (score 78). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 75 to 79, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Bypass paths of the delay checked and ruled out (the waiting time may be skipped).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Compound V3](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Farbitrum-sepolia%2F0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/arbitrum-0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $67M (DefiLlama), of which $15M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf) on the Arbitrum oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 319507783, methodology 0x51163f3cce461201…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Other hands: pauseGuardian() is a Safe 5-of-9 (0x78e6…1a9d). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.

Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0x3fb4d38e…f88a via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x5d3dfd6b0c855dcfe2cb768bb0800d16553c758b (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (CometWithExtendedAssetList, exact match, 0.8.15+commit.e14f2714). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (4 public RPC calls, no key)
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","latest"]}'
# owner() on the address the slot returned (a ProxyAdmin): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<address from the slot>","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# delay() on the holder (Compound-style timelock), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x3fb4d38ea7ec20d91917c09591490eeda38cf88a","data":"0x6a42b8f8"},"latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 515148086 and 515148107 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (latest block: this RPC cannot replay the block of the build, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia-rollup.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000009c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf"},"latest"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (78 = 0x4e); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.