Can one person move the money in Arbitrum Security Council Emergency Safe on Arbitrum? The authority score is 64 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. A real, publicly-named 9-of-12 Safe that can bypass the ordinary L2 core Timelock’s 8-day delay in an emergency - the chain’s own systemic root, not a bounded protocol authority.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 40 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A real, publicly-named 9-of-12 Safe that can bypass the ordinary L2 core Timelock’s 8-day delay in an emergency - the chain’s own systemic root, not a bounded protocol authority.
every protocol above inherits this
A standard, publicly-documented part of Arbitrum’s own security model (an intentional emergency-bypass path, not a discovered flaw), scored on the strength of the Safe itself and the ordinary delay that still applies to the non-emergency path.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 53.00% (score 64). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 55 to 94, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/arbitrum-0x423552c0f05baccac5bfa91c6dcf1dc53a0a1641.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $1.4B (DefiLlama, the whole chain), of which $506M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x423552c0f05baccac5bfa91c6dcf1dc53a0a1641 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x423552c0f05baccac5bfa91c6dcf1dc53a0a1641) on the Arbitrum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 319507783, methodology 0x51163f3cce461201…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia-rollup.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000423552c0f05baccac5bfa91c6dcf1dc53a0a1641"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (64 = 0x40); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.