Can one person move the money in GMX V2 (Synthetics) RoleStore on Arbitrum? The authority score is 19 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. CORRECTED 2026-09-19 (71 to 22): TIMELOCK_ADMIN on the live RoleStore includes a bare EOA (GMX’s own timelock_admin_2) that can queue a grant of ANY role through TimelockConfig and execute it after 24h. The 5-of-8 Safe can only veto (cancel / revokeRole).
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 10 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 50 |
| price feed | 52 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
CORRECTED 2026-09-19 (71 to 22): TIMELOCK_ADMIN on the live RoleStore includes a bare EOA (GMX’s own timelock_admin_2) that can queue a grant of ANY role through TimelockConfig and execute it after 24h. The 5-of-8 Safe can only veto (cancel / revokeRole).
CORRECTION: a single key starts the clock
The earlier score checked a ConfigTimelockController (0xC77E…) that holds no role on the live RoleStore. The live ROLE_ADMIN holders are the GMX DAO timelock, ConfigTimelockController 0x2Dd99f39… and TimelockConfig 0xE7706986… (both Sourcify-verified), all with a 24h delay. Verified on 2 RPCs. See chains/arbitrum-ecosystem/data/rotation_audit_2026-09-19-index0-gmx-rolestore.md. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20 (composite 22 to 19, Arbitrum Sepolia block 310866307): the GMX DAO timelock 0x4bd1cdAa…, the other ROLE_ADMIN timelock (24h), has a second bare EOA (0xE7BfFf2a…) holding PROPOSER, EXECUTOR and CANCELLER next to the Governor contract, and the 5-of-8 Safe holds none of those roles there; a schedule of a ROLE_ADMIN grant simulates fine from that EOA and reverts from a random address and from the Safe. So a single key can queue and, after 24h, execute a grant with no Governor vote and no Safe veto, and the veto credit drops (timelock 60 to 50). Admin and multisig were already at the bare-EOA floor.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 19 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): timelock from 50 to 52, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/arbitrum-0x3c3d99fd298f679dbc2cecd132b4ec4d0f5e6e72.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $203M (DefiLlama), of which $165M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x3c3d99fd298f679dbc2cecd132b4ec4d0f5e6e72 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x3c3d99fd298f679dbc2cecd132b4ec4d0f5e6e72) on the Arbitrum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 319507783, methodology 0x51163f3cce461201…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia-rollup.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000003c3d99fd298f679dbc2cecd132b4ec4d0f5e6e72"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (19 = 0x13); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.