{
 "version": "v1",
 "generatedAt": "2026-10-15T21:09:14Z",
 "name": "Robinhood Chain\u2019s own L1 rollup authority",
 "named_from": "dashboard",
 "chain": "Robinhood Chain",
 "address": "0x23a19d23e89166adedbdcb432518ab01e4272d94",
 "composite": 57,
 "band": "moderate",
 "keys_to_move": null,
 "react_hours": null,
 "money_per_key_usd": null,
 "not_assessed": [
  "how many keys it takes to move it",
  "the time anyone has to react",
  "the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count)"
 ],
 "sub": {
  "adminKeyScore": 78,
  "multisigScore": 75,
  "timelockScore": 10,
  "oracleAuthorityScore": 100,
  "crossExposureScore": 100
 },
 "requirements": [
  {
   "label": "Admin power is not a bare key",
   "met": true
  },
  {
   "label": "At least a 3-of-5 multisig",
   "met": true
  },
  {
   "label": "A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass",
   "met": false
  },
  {
   "label": "Bypass paths of the delay checked and ruled out",
   "met": false
  },
  {
   "label": "Price feed not under one hand",
   "met": true
  },
  {
   "label": "No key shared with another tracked protocol",
   "met": true
  }
 ],
 "exit_window": "a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out",
 "tvl_usd": 1038246835.7252538,
 "category": null,
 "at_risk_usd": 446446139.36185914,
 "narrative": {
  "summary": "A real, publicly-named 7-of-8 Security Council Safe, plus a Timelock that - corrected in batch 8 - turns out to genuinely gate changes now, just with no separation between who can propose and who can veto.",
  "tag": "every dApp above inherits this",
  "detail": "Six core L1 contracts on Ethereum mainnet (Rollup, SequencerInbox, CoreProxyAdmin, DelayedInbox, Bridge, Outbox - not the L2 itself) share one authority chain. EXECUTOR_ROLE is held directly by a 7-of-8 Gnosis Safe named by Robinhood\u2019s own governance docs: Robinhood (2 seats), BitGo, Chainlink Labs, Fireblocks, Offchain Labs, Paxos and Talos - though no public source maps a specific address to a specific institution. A second EXECUTOR_ROLE holder is a real, correctly-configured 7-day TimelockController. Batch 8 found and fixed a real bug here: this scorer had a hardcoded note from batch 4 claiming zero PROPOSER_ROLE holders, silently asserted as current fact on every push since - a live replay now shows a real holder (a 6-of-8 Safe), so the timelock does gate something today. But that same Safe also holds CANCELLER_ROLE - whoever can propose a change can also cancel any attempt to veto it, so there\u2019s still no real separation of powers. This group's 14 root signers (7 direct Safe seats + 7 owners of one nested 3-of-7 seat) share none with any other tracked group (crossExposureScore: 100)."
 },
 "score_account": null,
 "paused": null,
 "side_roles": null,
 "side_pending": null,
 "safe_activity": null,
 "admin_probe": null,
 "held": null,
 "dispute": null,
 "independent_read_reproduce": null,
 "history": [
  {
   "t": "2026-10-13T03:26:46Z",
   "composite": 57,
   "from": "push"
  }
 ],
 "feed": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RealSpap/authority-risk-oracle-showcase/watch-data/feed/robinhood-chain/0x23a19d23e89166adedbdcb432518ab01e4272d94.xml",
 "reproduce": {
  "rpc": "https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc",
  "to": "0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52",
  "data": "0xd47875d000000000000000000000000023a19d23e89166adedbdcb432518ab01e4272d94",
  "block": "latest",
  "composite_word": 6,
  "block_honoured": false,
  "note": "this RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the call reproduces the current value, not the one of the build; compare the composite and lastUpdated with this page",
  "curl": "curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"eth_call\",\"params\":[{\"to\":\"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52\",\"data\":\"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000023a19d23e89166adedbdcb432518ab01e4272d94\"},\"latest\"]}'"
 },
 "consumer_example": {
  "verdict": "zero",
  "collateral_factor_bps": 0,
  "text": "collateral factor 0 (score 57 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60)"
 },
 "cheapest_fix": {
  "band": "decent",
  "next": 60,
  "axis": "admin key",
  "from": 78,
  "to": 85,
  "what": "a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others)"
 },
 "main_gap": {
  "requirement": "A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass",
  "reason": "Changes can apply with no waiting time"
 },
 "independent_read": {
  "path": null,
  "holder": null,
  "pending_admin": null,
  "pending_via": null,
  "self_delay_seconds": null,
  "kind": "native",
  "why": "no code at this address on the chain's mainnet: a derived identifier for a native (non-EVM) entity such as HyperCore, or a contract that lives on another chain (a rollup's own L1 contracts); nothing for this reader to compare here"
 },
 "score_cluster": null,
 "last_pushed": 1791862006,
 "stale": false,
 "methodology_hash": "0x667dc486af9557a83488110fdb18fe653ba6d3be4773420590ee53b4a052fa45",
 "block": 136039274,
 "live": "https://realspap.github.io/oracle/#chain=all&q=0x23a19d23e89166adedbdcb432518ab01e4272d94",
 "page": "https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x23a19d23e89166adedbdcb432518ab01e4272d94.html",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0, attribution: Authority Risk Oracle, realspap.github.io/oracle"
}